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Abstract
Background: The share of out-of-pocket payments in Iranian families has the greatest burden on the poor and
lead to an impoverishment caused by catastrophic health expenditures. In order to improve access of the poor to
public resources, it is necessary to create a better governance system and effective policy-making. The purpose of
this study is to improve network effectiveness of the Iranian health system and to design a financial protection
network for the poor, based on the network governance theory.
Methods: We are using a quantitative method framework in conjunction with a Social network analysis (SNA)
strategy. To draw an optimal network, we conducted interviews with experts by focusing on the arrangement and
relationship among different institutions. The research sample was purposefully selected. We used UCINET software
for data analysis and NetDraw software to draw networks.
Results: In this article, an optimal network was proposed with the following characteristics: First, the problem of
the density of relationships among several central institutions and the isolation of the other institutions have been
solved. Second, in our model, the relationships have been distributed in a balanced manner among all institutions
in the network. Third, the number of participants has been reduced and consensus on poor people support policies
has been achieved in this optimal network. Forth, executive organizations keep their central positions and upper
institutions are not at the central position, so that the power is distributed in favor of more balanced governance.
However, in order to increase efficiency and to have coherent decision-making, it is necessary to establish a “core”
for this optimal network. The “core” has to include the organizations with the most relationship with others.
© The Author(s). 2021 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
* Correspondence: ashtrian@ut.ac.ir
3Department of Public Policy, School of Law and Political Sciences, University
of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Etemadi et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2021) 21:556 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-021-06581-3
Conclusion: The result revealed that the usefulness of network analysis as a tool for proposing the effectiveness of
governance. By strengthening the relationship among the main actors, an organized system of network
management can be achieved. The network has to include all actors from different levels, from policy-making to
implementation. The network also has to clarify the tasks from identifying the poor to covering costs. From an
academic perspective, this study showed the adequacy of network analysis as a tool for policy sciences.
Governance in our optimal health financial protection model follows the shared-governance pattern due to its high
density, low centralization and low distance. The model of network governance can be the source of changes in
the health governance system. It is a necessary structural condition to provide access to universal health coverage.
Keywords: Network governance, Financial protection, The poor, Health, Shared-governance
Introduction
Poor people bear a greater burden of health costs than
the rich, and they don’t have adequate access to the
health care services [1]. One in four low-income families
is forced to burden heavy debts or sell its assets for
treatment [2, 3]. In the absence of a targeted mechanism
of government health subsidies for the poor, the rich are
more beneficial than the riche. According to para-
graph 10–4 of the policies enacted by the Expediency
Council government has the responsibility “to accord
special aid to the needy and the low-income deciles.
In the “Health Transformation Plan” this special aid
contains user fee reduction for patients in public hospi-
tals, which covers all citizens, not just the poor; as a re-
sult, the proportion of insured poor has decreased [4].
Iranian experience shows that insurance coverage with-
out targeted mechanisms could lead to Adverse effects
on redistribution of resources in the financing of health
services and jeopardizes justice in financial access to
health services [5]. Rationing, by restricting the needy
groups’ visits only to the university affiliated centers,
waiting queues and limiting services due to high referrals
in government centers [6]. The most important step to
provide financial access for poor is to implement reform
in health care system with a clear approach to insist on
institutional arrangement. Thus, institutional analysis
can help for designing a policy network model for sup-
porting the poor [7]. Good institutional network can
identify effective institutions and key linkages for redu-
cing poverty [8]. Policy design is challenging in Iran be-
cause of complexities of institutions, Overlapping the
roles, diversity of responsibilities, and different methods
of implementations. These issues need to be resolved in
the way that the roles and responsibilities of key players
be clarified and cooperative structures to be strength-
ened. In the same way cooperative procedures, manage-
ment capacity building and consultation process need to
be mapped [9].
Iran has 44 organizations/institutions that are required
to comply with legal obligations. For supporting 27 cat-
egories of the poor to financially access health services.
This plurality of institutions is unbalanced with regards
to their linkages and has created challenges for coordin-
ation, responsibility, efficiency, and performance. For in-
stance, for women-headed families and Orphans there is
19 organizations and for disabled persons 17 organiza-
tions are obliged to cooperate [10, 11].
In different examples, the governance deficit in Iran’s
health system has been examined in communications
between organizations involved in providing services.
The presence of multiple institutions of stewardship and
decision-making, as well as inefficiency in coordination
and organization of various components within the
health sector and between other sectors, pose a chal-
lenge to Iran’s health system stewardship. Bad communi-
cation and policy coordination between the health and
social welfare sectors, as well as a lack of other institu-
tions’ involvement and ineffective governance structures,
have been implemented [12]. Financial protection neces-
sitates intersectoral cooperation between governmental
and non-governmental entities in charge, but cooper-
ation among institutions is one of the policy challenges
in Iran [13].
Iran’s fragmented health-care system has resulted in
poor financial protection against medical expenses, high
cost sharing, mission duplication, and a lack of account-
ability [14]. The same problem persists when it comes to
other organizations’ coordination and collaboration in
order to protect citizens financially. To efficiently serve
the needy and achieve the mission of helping to improve
their health, charitable organizations, for example, must
coordinate and collaborate with counties, governorates,
welfare organizations and relief councils, and medical
universities. However, in the Iranian health system, such
a partnership between these institutions has yet to be
established [15].
Even though governance is a difficult issue in our
health system, few studies have looked at the health fi-
nancial protection system in Iran from an institutional
and participation standpoint, despite the fact that we be-
lieve the majority of problems in health system support
for the poor are rooted in the governance of Iran’s
health system. As a result, this research attempted to
take a fresh look at the issue.
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Network governance
Implementing public policies is a cooperative task and it
is impossible to conceive the one organization without
others. In a systematic perspective, organizations have
different task and organized roles within a network and
each of them has specific role [16]. complex policy prob-
lems need collective action and coordinative approach
by different players [17].
The literature of public policy suggest that networks
are a solution for complex problems. These problems
are multicausal and have no clear definitions, our solu-
tions for complex problems can cause side effects and
can create conflicts among different governmental sec-
tors [18].. Systemic solutions for complex problems need
participation of different stakeholders; so that it necessi-
tate multi-actor approach for policy problems. Recent
literature shows a paradigm shift from hierarchical
model of delivery service to networks [19].
Networks consist of different independent organiza-
tions that collaborate to achieve their social goals. These
networks can be created by law or by a contract among
them. They are considered as a formal collective action
mechanism for accomplishment of the goals of several
organizations -governmental as well as non-
governmental or non for benefit organizations [20]. lit-
erature on policy analysis shows that in complex situa-
tions, puzzle solving as policy analysis method can
discover solutions and designs. As Christopher Winship
state policy analysis need a model of analysis to substi-
tute instrumental rationality for resolving conflicting
policy goals [21].
In the 1990s, a new method of network-based govern-
ance emerged that expanded the range of management
and coordination mechanisms. This method has been
accompanied by a critique of the previous two methods,
namely market and hierarchy method, and is known for
its wide chain of communication, informal
organizational forms, and trust-based relationships [22].
The most popular approaches to health governance
are creating intersectoral networks, hybrid organisations,
and policy coordination, and network analysis is a tool
for drawing communications in the organizational net-
work. Individual organizations have been replaced as re-
form agents by networks, and networks are better suited
to manage public benefits such as wellbeing [23].
For Provan and Kenis, network governance involves
“the use of institutions and structures of authority and
collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and
control joint action across the network as a whole.”
Therefore, network governance has two related dimen-
sions of governance structure (collaboration structures)
and governance mechanism (coordinative tasks in net-
works). There are three types of governance of networks
structures: a shared-governance network (each network
member is responsible for decision-making and manage-
ment), a lead organization (a dominant organization re-
sponsible for network management), and a network
administrative organization (creating an independent out
of the network entity to manage it) [24].
After the classification of Provan and Kanis, the core-
peripheral governance form was introduced, which is
similar to the lead organization form, except that the re-
sponsibility of leading of the network lies not with one
organization but with a number of network organiza-
tions. The logic for this kind of responsibility is that net-
work consists of subgroups of organizations in different
areas; it is not necessary for all of them to be involved in
decision-making. The core consists representative of dif-
ferent organizations from each subgroup that can man-
age the network in the same way as a shared-governance
form or a lead organization. This type of governance is
the most effective form for complex issues that involve
various sub-processes [25].
Network analysis
The organizational network strategy is an excellent way
to comprehend health-related problems. The informa-
tion gleaned from network analysis is used to aid cap-
acity building by forming a strong network of partner
organizations. The health sector’s application of the
organizational network methodology has reached matur-
ity. If achieving a goal in the health sector exceeds an or-
ganization’s capability, network-level analysis is the most
effective method for analyzing health issues and con-
siders a focused and intelligent inter-sectoral mechanism
for problem solving [26].
Four underlying factors act as key predictors of the ef-
fectiveness of network governance performance: the level
of trust among members (density and centrality), the
number of organizations in the network, the level of
consensus on network goals and capacities of the net-
work [27]. Network optimization as a policy design can
be presented from various perspectives and with differ-
ent criteria. Although the criteria of efficiency and effect-
iveness have gradually been challenged in favor of the
criterion of democratic participation in policy design
[28], designing an optimal network of financial protec-
tion for the poor in the health system in Iran can be
seen and introduced as a manifestation of democratic
and efficient network governance.
The aim of this study was to map an optimal policy
network model for supporting the poor through gather-
ing social data on the governance of the network to sup-
port the poor in the Iranian health system based on
survey. This type of data gathering is established through
social network analysis which has been previously used
as a systematic method to describe and analyze the net-
work governance among multiple stakeholders in health
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system. The model will be effective to overcome the
challenges of overlapping organizational tasks and legal
duties of different institutions.
Method
Data collection
The current research is a quantitative study that employs
a social network analysis approach. Based on a network
of legal responsibilities and research into the perspec-
tives of experts in order to improve, the poor’s financial
safety net was created. We attempted to prepare a ques-
tionnaire of institutional options to accurately draw the
optimal network after designing questions related to the
optimal arrangement and communication among man-
dated institutions.
The questionnaire was designed with the goal of resolv-
ing problems in the legal obligations network, clarifying
ambiguous positions, avoiding conflicting tasks and re-
work, and improving relationships between institutions.
The questionnaire had three sections: demographic in-
formation, proposed institutional options, and a com-
menting section; if desired. A summary of the objectives
along with the institutional options for drawing up the
optimal network was sent to 30 experts on health finan-
cial protection, and they were requested to submit their
comments within a maximum of 1 week. The results
were reviewed and analyzed, and the model was devel-
oped based on those comments.
To assess the validity of the questions, the question-
naire has been presented to several experts in network
analysis and social welfare policy. Then, the question-
naire was given to five experts as a pilot. The accuracy
and validity of the questions were reviewed and cor-
rected based on experts’ recommendations.
Sampling
The research sample included 22 well-known experts
who were purposefully selected from experts. They had
high level of experience in financial support for the poor
and had also relationships with different actors in
organizational networks including Ministry of Health
and Medical Education (MOHME), Ministry of Cooper-
atives, Labor and Social Welfare (MCLSW), Iranian
Health Insurance Organization (IHIO), Iranian Red
Crescent Society (IRCS), as insiders, and independent
experts, as outsiders. We had equal number of insiders
and outsiders in our expert body of research with 11 in-
siders from four network organizations and other ex-
perts from the outside.
Insiders provided detailed information about relation-
ship among actors based on their direct experiences.
Similarly, outsiders were beneficial due to their ability to
view the entire network without direct involvement and,
therefore, without conflict of interest biases. These two
groups of informants, insiders and outsiders, provide us
the opportunity of additional level of confirmation re-
garding network data, and also reducing possible biases.
The combination of insiders and outsiders and relying
on information from internal and external experts bal-
ances the biases, widens the perspectives, and validate
methodology for incomplete SNA data [29].
Data analysis
A two-dimensional matrix was used to record the data
collected from the questionnaire; the selected institu-
tions by the experts formed the matrix rows, and the
policies and support programs formed the columns. The
value of matrix cells indicates the number of tasks each
organization performs for different programs. A value of
2 was assigned to the responsible institutions and a value
of 1 was assigned to cooperator institutions. Then, a
one-dimensional matrix of institutions was formed to
determine which one has the most collaboration with
other institutions and which one has more centrality,
power and position due to more collaboration with
others. UCINET software was used to enter data and
data analysis and NetDraw software was used to draw
networks and visual analysis.
Micro-indicators such as degree centrality (the identi-
fication of the network’s dominant actors) and between-
ness centrality (the identification of the network’s
dominant actors) (identification of actors that link be-
tween others) [30], Centrality of eigenvectors (the point
having a lot of central neighbors) [31], were used to rep-
resent the location of institutions in the network and
were normalized to lie between 0 and 1 [32]. as well as
Bonacich power (calculated based on the centralization
of connected points to somewhere between − 1 and + 1)
[33, 34]. Several social network research metrics help to
understand a system’s governance capacities. Density
(the ratio of the number of available links to the total
number of potential links in the network) is one of the
characteristics of a system that can be converted into
network governance metrics. The density measure’s
value can range from 0 to 1, with 1 representing
complete network density) [35], Geodesic distance (the
number of relationships between two actors in the short-
est possible stage, which is actually the most optimal or
successful contact between two actors) and
centralization (to the degree that cooperation in the net-
work focuses on a limited number of actors rather than
being equally distributed among all members) [36], In
this network, both of them, which ranged from 0 to 1,
were determined.
Findings
The amount of network indicators of the institutions
proposed by the experts, which has been calculated
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using UCINET software, is presented in Table 1. Only
11 of the 44 institutions listed in the network were rec-
ommended by the experts to be included in the optimal
network. The optimal network has solved the problems
in the network of legal obligations, such as the density of
contact between certain central institutions and the iso-
lation of other institutions, and relationships have been
distributed in a fair and orderly manner among all insti-
tutions present in the network.
Legal collaboration between responsible and partner
institutions regarding financial protection for the poor in
two different optimal and legal networks is presented in
Fig. 1. The intensity and weakness of communication
and the number of common tasks between the two en-
tities are indicated by the thickness of the lines, and or-
ganizations with a higher degree centrality are
represented by large squares.
Strengthening and balancing relationship of coordinat-
ing bodies (including Supreme Council, Ministries and
the Planning and Budgeting Organization) with execu-
tive bodies (Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, Welfare
Organization and Iranian Health Insurance Organization
(IHIO) on the one hand, and adequate relationship
among executive bodies with non-governmental institu-
tions (NGO) on the other hand, shows that in the pro-
posed model relationship is seen in the form of a
network. The strong presence of NGOs reflects the insti-
tutional approach to policy-making for financial protec-
tion. Balanced distribution of power between these
institutions reflects a network of relationships in finan-
cial protection policies.
Network’s micro-indicators
As it shows in Table 1, according to the experts, Welfare
Organization should have the most authority in the net-
work and with a very small difference, Relief Foundation,
MCLW and the IHIO stand in the next ranks. A
noteworthy point is the high centrality of charities,
which indicates the increased power of these institutions
due to change their position and relations and a demo-
cratic approach to policy-making. The position of the
Welfare Organization in the optimal network shows a
greater tendency towards centrality than the Relief
Foundation, which was the most powerful institution in
the network of legal obligations.
Betweenness centrality of the institutions is also of bal-
anced distribution, and the Welfare Organization, the
Relief Foundation, the MCLW, the MOHME, and the
IHIO have been proposed with the most betweenness
centrality. The high betweenness centrality of the Su-
preme Council of Health Insurance has made this coun-
cil more accessible and more executive than the
Supreme Council of Welfare and Social Security. Be-
tweenness centrality distribution is shown in Fig. 2.
The IHIO and the MCLW have the most special
eigenvector centrality due to the neighborhood with
more central institutions, and the Welfare Organization
is in the next rank. In the proposed network, the IHIO
has the highest Bonacich power due to the centralities of
the connected points, and the MCLW and the Welfare
Organization are in the next ranks. It is understood that
these institutions should have the most important role
in formulating strategies as well as executive activities of
financial protection.
In an optimal network, there are no cut points (entities
whose removal from the network causes the network to
become two separate parts and can cause or prevent re-
lationship between other entities) and this indicates that
the network is optimal in terms of more balanced distri-
bution of power between institutions and better state of
relationship between institutions. In general, due to the
change in the position of institutions and increasing
organizational relationships between them, the deep dif-
ference between the maximum and minimum number
Table 1 Indicators of the optimal network of institutions related to financial protection for the poor
Institution Degree Centrality Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality Bonacich’s
power
1 Welfare Organization (WO) 0.372 0.825 0.486 1.611
2 Imam Khomeini Relief Committee 0.348 0.825 0.428 .1.419
3 Ministry of Cooperative, Labor and Social welfare (MCLSW 0.338 0.825 0.508 1.684
4 Iranian Health Insurance Organization (IHIO) 0.319 0.825 0.510 1.690
5 Charities 0.177 0.125 0.191 0.633
6 Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MOHME) 0.125 0.825 0.120 0.397
7 Municipalities 0.086 0.125 0.086 0.285
8 Supreme Council of Welfare and Social Security (SCWSS) 0.057 0 0.056 0.188
9 Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) 0.045 0.125 0.043 0.144
10 Supreme Council of Health Insurance (SCHI) 0.024 0.500 0.018 0.059
11 Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) 0.009 0 0.008 0.028
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of relationships and the difference in the centrality of ac-
tors in the network of legal obligations has decreased.
The cohesion has increased and the distribution of
power and relationships has become more rational
(Fig. 3).
Having more centrality means better position of acces-
sibility in the network, which in turn increases collabor-
ation power compared to others. In an optimal network
of financial protection for the poor, the Welfare
Organization, the Relief Foundation, the MCLW and the
IHIO were recognized as the most powerful institutions.
The majority of experts have chosen the following tasks
and responsibilities for different institutions: the Su-
preme Council of Welfare and Social Security for policy-
making and supervising financial protection policies; the
MCLW and the Welfare Organization to identify the
poor; the IHIO for basic insurance of the poor and cost-
sharing coverage; the Welfare Organization and the Re-
lief Foundation to cover the costs of services outside the
benefit package and referring to health centers; and the
MCLW as a single window for division of tasks among
institutions. More network connections have been sug-
gested between the Welfare Organization, the Relief
Foundation, the MCLW and the IHIO.
Network’s macro-indicators
Network governance indicators including density,
centralization and distance between actors in the opti-
mal network were calculated. The density of the legal
obligations network of financial protection was 32.7%,
which shows that the density among the 44 institutions
present in the network is at a weak level and the
Fig. 1 The degree centrality of the optimal financial protection network (above) and the legal obligations network of financial protection (below)
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relationship and collaboration between the institutions is
not favorable. On the other hand, this index has reached
90% in the optimal network, which shows that the opti-
mal network has a very high density.
The centralization in the optimal financial protection
network is 0.11, which indicates that the network is
decentralized and the flow of information is not re-
stricted to a limited number of actors.
The average geodesic distance in the network of legal
obligations is 2.2. It indicates that the organizational
unity in the field of financial protection for the poor
among the institutions involved in the network is weak.
When all the actors are directly connected, the average
distance will be 1 and the flow of information is ex-
pected to be fast. In the optimal network with fewer ac-
tors, the distance is 1.09, which indicates that the actors
are all in direct contact with each other. The network is
governed by a shared-governance model of the partici-
pants, according to these indicators.
Discussion
Networks describe the pattern of relationship among ac-
tors, while the governance perspective on networks
raises the question of how these networks achieve their
goals and what mechanisms govern their performance.
Where market mechanisms and hierarchies are not ef-
fective, the network as a structure of governance will be
the most appropriate option [37].
In this article, to minimize the weaknesses of the legal
obligations network, an optimal policy network has been
proposed with regard to financial protection policies for
the poor in order to access to the health services. We
Fig. 2 Betweenness centrality of the optimal financial protection network (above) and the legal obligations network of financial
protection (below)
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can design policies for financial protection of the poor in
accessing health services more coherently through in-
creasing cooperation and equitable distribution of
power, as well as making partnerships more efficient,
through a shared-governance model. The number of in-
stitutions responsible for financial protection of the poor
in the proposed optimal network decreased from 44 to
11, and according to the experts, a large number of mar-
ginalized institutions were eliminated. The Welfare
Organization and the Relief Foundation were designated
by the experts as the most powerful institutions in the
network.
There is pluralistic institutional diversity with differ-
ent level of power in the existing network: Supreme
Councils as regulation body, Ministry as headquarters,
different organizations as the executive body, and
para-governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions, with the shared-governance arrangement, which
ensures that all members have a fair say in decision-
making.
Since power is distributed among different actors in
the current network and the network is not focused
on a single actor with unbalanced power, it cannot
operate as a leading force. In proposed model all re-
lated organizations involved in financial protection for
the poor have been seen in the network and therefore
there is no need for creating a separate administrative
organization.
Key predictors of the effectiveness of the optimal net-
work governance indicate that there In the current net-
work, there is no lead agency. This is due to the limited
number of participants, high consensus on priorities,
particularly due to the presence of several upstream laws
on financial protection for the poor in the health system,
and executive agencies, such as the IHIO, occupying the
network’s central role, Relief Foundation and Welfare
Organization, as well as organizations in higher adminis-
trative hierarchies in the network, such as ministries,
have non-centralized positions, compared to executive
organizations as an important indicator to determine the
Fig. 3 The cut points in the optimal network of financial protection (above) and the legal obligations network of financial protection (below)
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type of governance structure, which is clarified in this
network [38].
As a result, shared-governance is the best network
governance model for financial protection for the vul-
nerable in Iran’s health system. In this model the net-
work is managed by engagement of all members in
interaction, decisions are made collectively The power is
equally distributed, and there are no cut points in the
network, which can be achieved easily by two supreme
councils as extra-ministerial institutions. This method of
network governance is the most effective way to reach a
solution to a complex problem.
Shared-governance is the most common and simplest
form of network governance, especially in health sector.
It is highly dense (high inter-organizational relationship)
and decentralized, and rely on the collective participa-
tion of all organizations to make decisions and manage
the network. Decision-making power is distributed
among all organizations regardless of their size, re-
sources and performance [39]. This type of governance
creates a culture of participation among organizations
and is therefore able to increase network integrity. This
form of governance is important to promote the integra-
tion of service delivery organizations that serve heteroge-
neous target groups with a variety of problems [40]..
Integrity is an essential feature of a network that deter-
mines the resource exchange among organizations and
network’s response to the target groups. Matured
shared-governance networks are more integrated than
networks without shared-governance [41]. Due to the
governance structure style, similarity of roles, and equal
control, our proposed network appears to be highly inte-
grated. Coordinative meetings -by sharing information,
discussing new issues, exchanging resources, increasing
collaboration, etc.- are effective tools for achieving
shared-governance. The steering comity consisting of 4
or 5 representatives of the member organizations are in
charge of the executive affairs. To increase network in-
tegrity, this type of governance must improve manage-
ment strategies such as goal consensus, information
exchange, and conflict resolution among organizations
[42]. Meetings with members from the ideal network’s
11 member organizations may be convened with the aim
of exchanging knowledge and formulating joint policy.
Since a simple form of governance is insufficient to
solve a complex problem, and because of the economic
crisis and funding issues that make it difficult to ad-
equately help the vulnerable in accessing health services
in Iran, the authors of this article propose that a network
core group be created within the shared-governance
framework. It will help more coherent decision-making.
This core community includes Relief Foundation, Wel-
fare Organization, MCLW, and IHIO, which are consid-
ered to have the most interactions with other members
of the network, according to social network research. As
Cristofoli study has shown, the success of shared-
governance networks depends on the presence of net-
work administrators and the use of formal inter-
organizational coordination mechanisms. Successful
shared-governance networks tend to take more bureau-
cratic approach to ensure power sharing and manage-
ment of the network in accordance with established
rules and regulations [43].
The study of the structure of Kerman Health and Food
Security Council has shown that the shift of relationship
from hierarchical and market-oriented to network logic
has not yet occurred. This structure is suffered from
problems such as large number of members, inability to
solve complex problems, and lack of trust, legitimacy,
and consensus among members. Therefore, a network
management organization is considered as an effective
way of governing to solve social problems in the field of
health [44].
In legal obligation model, according to the law, sev-
eral institutions are involved in policy making and
policy implementation. This has led to overlapping
tasks, slowness, and incoherence. The multiplicity of
tasks and duties has created a tangle of confusion
about the type, amount, and scope of responsibilities
among the actors. Distribution of power among finan-
cial protection institutions for the poor is not well
established, and there is no strong communication be-
tween governmental and non-governmental institu-
tions, charities or private institutions in this field.
These issues have been resolved in the optimal net-
work with shared-governance model.
In the optimal network, charities’ position has been
strengthened compared to the network of legal obliga-
tions. That is why experts in government consider char-
ities as important bodies to support the poor in the
health sector. Charities as non-profit sector are able to
effectively address the problems of the poor with a more
human-centered and flexible approach. They can reduce
injustice and social deprivation [45]. Manenti states that
NGOs and civil society are sometimes viewed negatively
by government agencies and therefore their role be-
comes limited [46]. Our study find that Iranian experts
have positive and participatory attitude to involve char-
ities in supporting the poor.
Heo et al. used a network analysis approach to evalu-
ate the relationship between government and non-
government sectors and suggest policy-making options
to promote the health of poor residents of disadvantaged
areas. They showed that among different actors,
community-based organizations (with spontaneously or-
ganized independent groups of volunteers for health
promotion) have played a key role in sharing and con-
trolling information resources for health promotion [47];
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a role that can be played by charities in the optimal net-
work of financial protection for the poor in Iran.
Conclusion
Using a social network analysis approach as a policy tool
to demonstrate the pattern of network governance of fi-
nancial protection for the poor in the health system, this
study showed that by strengthening the relationship be-
tween the main actors in this field, an organized system
of network management with a limited number of coor-
dinated actors can be achieved. The network has to in-
clude all actors from different levels; from policy-making
to implementation in various fields, with clarifying tasks
from identifying the poor to covering costs at the point
of service delivery.
Social network analysis as a tool for displaying and
manifesting network governance at the level of network
management showed the relationship and proportional-
ity between these two approaches in public policy sci-
ences, including health policy. Governance in the
optimal health financial protection network for the poor
in Iran follows the shared-governance pattern due to its
high density, low centralization and distance.
The network governance model governing the optimal
policy-making network of financial support for poor
people to access health services in Iran, as a model of
transformation of inter-organizational communications
in complex policy issues, can be the source of changes in
the health governance system in Iran as a prerequisite
for access to universal health coverage.
The current minimal literature primarily discusses
governance issues without offering a straightforward so-
lution. This study shed light on one of Iran’s most press-
ing issues in health system governance and attempted to
find a solution by changing the existing governance sys-
tem and introducing a new model to address the interor-
ganizational challenges. In the case of financial
protection for the poor in Iran, this paper added to our
understanding of health system governance and its pre-
ferred framework, as well as to the literature by narrowly
visualizing health system governance.
Recognizing the preferred governance model of orga-
nizations tasked with financial protection duties will en-
courage policymakers to use this proposed arrangement
and bring these suggested actors to the negotiating table
in order to design and enforce effective protection
measures.
Study strengths and limitation
To our knowledge, this is the first study in Iran to use
quantitative methods, especially network analysis, to in-
vestigate the governance of institutions responsible for
health financial protection. Other countries will benefit
from the lessons and models discussed here. We had
some limitations in addressing the shortcomings of lit-
erature in the form of peer-reviewed work derived from
the Iranian context because the literature on the govern-
ance of health financial protection organizations in Iran
was not rich and we found no research to compare this
problem directly. This limitation could add to the sig-
nificance and value of this study in filling an information
gap. Because of political and institutional interests, some
participants may have felt compelled to keep their tech-
nical opinions to themselves. We attempted to monitor
this possible source of bias by using heterogeneous sam-
pling and soliciting the views of various actors.
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